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Rethinking the Youth Bulge and 
Violence
Akram Alfy*
Abstract The dominance of a generation of combat age, high levels 
of education combined with high unemployment, failed cities, and 
the relatively long duration of the transitional period still constitute 
an appropriate atmosphere for the explosion of a new wave of youth 
violence in the Middle East. The author takes Egypt as a case study. Egypt 
witnessed an unprecedented spike in violence following the revolution of 
January 25, 2011. This article first examines the political violence through 
the lens of political demography, drawing partly on Henrik Urdal’s theses 
on the impact of demographic factors on the risk of political violence, but 
more broadly documents and analyses the trajectory of youth movements’ 
involvement with violence in relation to issues of employment, education 
and urbanisation. 
1 Introduction
Several analyses have attempted to explain the growing political 
violence in Egypt since January 2011, most of  them attributing 
the repeated clashes to political polarisation, economic decline, the 
security vacuum, the decline of  state status and authority, the absence 
of  social consensus, or the intensification of  the class struggle. Some 
analysts have also focused on young people’s sense of  frustration with 
the hijacking of  the revolution, first by the Supreme Council of  the 
Armed Forces (SCAF), and later by the Muslim Brotherhood, and their 
attempts to reclaim their stolen rights and confront the aspirations of  
the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition to political and social causes, 
others have discussed what they see as a shift in the Egyptian character 
following the revolution, from submission and concession to rebellion 
and rejection. Writings have addressed the behavioural changes of  
Egyptians, the emergence of  a culture of  violence, and the escape from 
the grip of  repression.1
In the context of  this debate, this article looks at rising violence using 
political demography, which seeks to interpret political behaviour, 
including political violence, using demographic factors. The article 
discusses the nexus between youth cohorts’ domination of  the population 
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pyramid, growing numbers of  young university graduates, and violence, 
in addition to the role of  urban growth and urbanisation in increasing 
the risk of  political violence. Finally, the article looks at how political 
instability and the extended duration of  the transitional period have also 
increased the likelihood of  violence, as well as other possible factors, such 
as previous experience of  deploying violence as a method of  contestation 
and the organisational structure of  youth movements. 
1.1 Combat age and the youth bulge
In 2013, the number of  young people aged 15–29 in Egypt reached 
24.38 million (CAPMAS 2013: 5), in a society where 54 per cent of  the 
population was already under the age of  24. This fact in itself  increases the 
risk of  political violence, according to Henrik Urdal and Jack Goldstone. 
According to Urdal, youth bulges in a country increase the potential 
and motives for political violence, especially if  they are associated with 
other factors, such as high youth unemployment, a quasi-democratic 
system, and a high dependency ratio (Urdal 2006: 609). Goldstone 
believes that the potential for violence and political change is higher 
in societies experiencing the second stage of  the demographic 
transition, which brings higher birth rates, lower mortality rates, and 
the beginning of  industrial progress and service provision. This stage 
is also characterised by a high proportion of  youth (aged 15–24) in the 
population age structure and a growing middle class of  educated young 
people that the labour market is unable to absorb (Goldstone, Kaufman 
and Duffy Toff 2012: 9).
In political demography, youth bulges signify a high proportion of  youth 
(young people aged 14–25) in the total population, meaning that society 
is young. If  we observe Tsegaye Tegenu, whose definition of  the youth 
bulge in developing countries includes ages 15–29 (Tegenu 2011), then 
youth in Egypt comprise 29 per cent of  the population. This makes 
the country a good testing ground for Urdal’s well-known thesis which 
posits that societies where youth comprise 35 per cent of  the population 
are 150 per cent more likely to experience an explosion of  political 
violence than countries whose population age structure is closer to 
developed countries.
In political demography, a youth bulge means that a cohort of  combat 
age dominates the population pyramid, thereby increasing the chances 
of  violence. Eric Neumayer observes that young males constitute the 
principal bloc of  participants in violence, the same view adopted by 
Samuel Huntington, who found that people who fight other people are 
largely men aged 16–30 (Urdal 2006: 612). 
The character of  political violence in Egypt conforms to these 
hypotheses, as most of  those involved in the violence are aged between 
15 and 29. The ages of  those involved in youth movements that have 
adopted violence is similar: Ultras football fans are typically aged 
15–22, and most members of  April 62 are aged 18–29, while the age of  
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Black Bloc members does not exceed 22 (both the Ultras and the Black 
Bloc are discussed further below). In violent clashes between February 
2011 and June 2013, 80 per cent of  the injured were aged 15–29, while 
70 per cent of  the dead belonged to the same cohort.3
The relatively high proportion of  young people in Egypt has provided 
fuel to youth movements in recent years, and has increased the 
likelihood that these movements will resort to violence as the ‘combat 
generation’ dominates the field of  political actors, a situation reflected in 
the competition among political blocs to recruit and mobilise the largest 
number of  youth. The demographic rise of  this generation comes as 
it declares its political triumph and its power to settle conflicts at the 
decisive moment, and for young people, the fastest means of  conflict 
resolution is violence. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the youth 
bulge in Egyptian society is what has driven youth movements to adopt 
the strategy of  violence, or is what has increased the resort to use force 
to settle conflicts. 
1.2 The young combatant: an educated person looking for a job
The massacre at the Port Said stadium on 1 February 2012, in which 
72 members of  the Ahli Ultras were killed, revealed several facts about 
these football fan clubs. Most importantly, they are comprised of  young 
men with generally high levels of  education. Indeed, most of  the victims 
of  the massacre were university students, including some at private 
universities, where annual tuition ranges from US$5,000–10,000. This 
came as a shock to many Egyptians, who assumed that these football 
fans were largely less-educated youth. 
Yet, young people with a university degree or who are enrolled in 
university constitute the backbone of  Egyptian youth movements that 
have used violence. This is also true of  the Black Bloc; one of  its leaders 
stated that those involved in this underground organisation range in 
age from 18 to 23 years old, and are all either university students or 
graduates.4 University graduates and students also make up the bulk of  
April 6. 
The Egyptian condition thus contradicts the thesis of  many schools of  
terrorism studies, which in the 1980s and 1990s posited a correlation 
between low education and violence. It is, however, consistent with 
modern demographic theories that suggest that higher educational 
levels in young societies increase the risk of  violence. 
For Urdal, the spread of  unemployment among university graduates 
provokes feelings of  frustration and deprivation among a large segment 
of  educated youth, which increases the potential for violence (Urdal 
2004). Brynjar Lia attributes the growth in university education in several 
Middle Eastern countries to the rise in large cohorts of  educated youth 
not absorbed by the labour markets in these countries, thus fostering a 
climate ripe for the recruitment of  these youth into radical and violent 
organisations (Lia 2005). Similarly, Jack Goldstone posits that the likelihood 
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of  violence by large youth groups increases with higher levels of  education. 
He believes that an exponential increase in the numbers of  educated youth 
helps foster a climate for political change, as the most educated youth are 
at the forefront of  political violence in periods of  political change. Richard 
Braungart supports the thesis by noting that unemployment in any society 
weakens the legitimacy and stability of  the political system, which creates 
an environment ripe for the radicalisation of  young people who have 
nothing to lose in the struggle for revolutionary gains. 
Higher levels of  education feed the sense of  dissatisfaction among 
educated youth, who are more ambitious and expect to obtain a 
better income. In turn, this increases the gap between expectations 
and the reality of  unemployment. Educated youth also have a greater 
sense of  the possibilities of  political influence. Thus real or potential 
unemployment among young graduates or university students increases 
the likelihood of  dissatisfaction, instability and violence. 
As for Egypt, according to the World Bank, 
During the last two decades, the evolution of  educational attainment 
in Egypt has been one of  democratization of  access, particularly 
at the basic and secondary levels… An examination of  three 
generations of  21–24 year olds, born between 1964 to 1967, 1974 to 
1977 and 1982 to 1985, most of  whom have already completed their 
education, shows that preparatory completion rates increased steadily 
from 43 per cent to 69 per cent and secondary completion rates 
from 38 per cent to 65 per cent. College completion rates among 
the same groups have more than doubled from 7 per cent in 1988 to 
17 per cent in 2006 (Ersado 2012). 
Some 332,776 students graduated from Egyptian public universities 
and 10,726 from Egyptian private universities in 2011 (CAPMAS 2013: 
130–31), while in the same year, 1.7 million students were enrolled in 
these universities.5 
The rapid increase in graduates of  universities and institutions of  
higher education coincided with an exponential increase in youth 
unemployment, particularly among those with university degrees. 
According to official figures, unemployment in 2013 reached 12 per 
cent, or about 3.18 million people (CAPMAS 2013: 30). Unemployment 
was highest among the 20–24 age cohort, at 40 per cent, followed by 
ages 25–29, at 23 per cent. Unemployment among those with university 
degrees came in at 32.1 per cent. 
These data clearly indicate that substantial numbers of  Egyptian 
graduates have not been able to find jobs, which feeds their sense of  
frustration and anger at the regime and society. University graduates 
have positive expectations of  jobs, a steady income, and class mobility. 
According to Dan LaGraffe, this frustration is reflected in heightened 
social and political alienation, the increased likelihood of  instability, and 
a tendency to adopt radical ideas and behaviour (LaGraffe 2012: 72). 
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This contradicts the thesis of  Paul Collier that posits that poorer, less-
educated youth are more likely to join radical, violent organisations 
because of  the low recruitment cost. It should also be noted that high 
youth unemployment increases the dependency ratio, which, Urdal 
notes, is a decisive factor for the increased chance of  violence in 
communities (Urdal 2006).
In Egypt, substantial numbers of  young university graduates are 
frustrated by the dearth of  job opportunities and their inability to 
influence the political process and the ruling elite. This frustration is 
expressed as a generational clash, exemplified in a statement issued by 
the White Knights football fan club, which noted that the clashes with 
security were an expression of  ‘the battle of  an entire generation that 
only asked for a normal life, only asked that it be the master of  its own 
affairs, as they know their affairs best’. The statement noted that security 
practices against the fan clubs were not exclusively a war on them, but 
targeted an entire generation of  young people who are longing to be rid 
of  the gerontocracy with all its corruption, sordidness and misery.6
The commanders in this virtual generational war are educated youth 
frustrated by unemployment – a substantial youth bloc in the country. 
In Egypt, youth violence is concentrated in the capital and large cities, 
especially in the Delta, which is richer than Upper Egypt. This calls for 
a closer look at the relationship between youth political violence and 
urbanisation. 
1.3 Failed cities and political violence
Violent clashes between protesting youth and security or between 
competing Egyptian political factions have been concentrated in 
Cairo and large urban areas. Of  the 65 instances of  socio-political 
violence documented by this study, through a systematic review of  the 
daily Al Masry Al Youm newspaper from 11 February 2011 to 30 June 
2013, 33 took place in the capital. Of  the 16 most violent incidents, 
12 occurred in Cairo, or 75 per cent. 
Dan LaGraffe observes that the danger of  failed cities, much like failed 
states, clearly figures in the academic literature on violence and security. 
LaGraffe cites a study from the National Intelligence Council noting that 
the shift from agricultural to service and industrial employment has brought 
young people from rural to urban areas at dangerously high rates (LaGraffe 
2012: 70). The growth of  urban areas in recent years in less developed 
countries has led to heightened pressure for equality and a growing sense 
of  social grievance, making cities more vulnerable to instability. Large 
cities now hold greater numbers of  educated, unemployed youth and are 
thus a centre for social tensions given wide class and social gaps, which are 
more visible in urban than rural areas. In addition, cities are closer to the 
institutions of  power, which have a more palpable presence in urban areas. 
This opens up a space for conflict between angry, frustrated youth and 
a state unable to realise their aspirations – indeed, often perceived as the 
primary obstacle to a dignified life. 
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Egypt offers an exemplary model of  centralisation, with 20 million 
people, or nearly 25 per cent of  the population, living in Greater Cairo 
(the governorates of  Cairo, Giza and Qalyoubiya), one of  the highest 
urban concentrations in the world; the population of  Cairo alone is 
approximately 8.9 million, or 13 per cent of  the population.7 According 
to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), 
approximately 43 per cent of  the population of  Egypt live in urban 
areas, while 57 per cent live in rural areas. Urban areas in Egypt are 
growing at a rate of  1.9 per cent annually (2000–10). With annual 
population growth less than 1 per cent, this points to the continued 
migration from the countryside to the city, meaning that cities absorb 
hundreds of  thousands of  new inhabitants each year. Meanwhile, rural 
areas account for 61.4 per cent of  all births, compared to 38.6 per 
cent for urban areas. The number of  city dwellers in Egypt rose from 
22.5 million in 1990 to 35.3 million in 2012, an increase of  65 per cent, 
representing 43 per cent of  the total population (CAPMAS 2013: 8). 
The availability of  educational services and universities in the capital 
allows it to absorb large numbers of  young university graduates, about 
30 per cent of  its residents according to unofficial figures. According 
to Richard Cincotta, the migration of  large populations from rural to 
urban areas in Egypt over the last two decades played a contributing 
role in creating the environment conducive to the eruption of  the 
January 25 revolution. The city offered youth the chance to express 
their aspirations and frustrations, to interact with the elite and the 
media, and to step out of  the space of  familial relationships and 
primary affiliations to the realm of  peer relationships and direct 
interests (Cincotta 2012).
In this context, Urdal notes that high rates of  urbanisation strengthen 
the correlation between youth bulges and political violence (Urdal 2006: 
613). Goldstone explains that high urbanisation rates are associated 
with increased unemployment among educated youth and economic 
marginalisation. Rapid urbanisation is reflected in relatively higher rates 
of  poverty and unemployment, two primary factors for youth political 
violence. Tegenu believes that urbanisation and rapid urban growth are 
directly linked to large concentrations of  youth. He argues that youth 
migration from rural to urban areas therefore constitutes a primary 
factor for the increased likelihood of  political violence, as urban youth 
with rural roots have a greater tendency to violence in moments of  
political instability. 
The centrality of  Cairo is reflected in the makeup of  the youth protest 
groups under study. The study focused on the most important youth 
groups at the time (2011–13) and excluded the Islamist groups as they 
were addressed in Bakr’s article in this IDS Bulletin. Young people from 
Cairo account for more than 35 per cent of  the members of  the Ultras 
football fan clubs, for both the Ahli and Zamalek clubs.8 According to 
another report, there are 360,000 registered Ahli Ultras, with 90,000 
of  them, or 25 per cent, from Cairo, which is the most influential and 
(Endnotes)
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active branch.9 As for the Black Bloc, a leader of  the movement says 
that of  300 active members, some 200 are from Cairo. The movement 
itself  first emerged in Cairo during the demonstrations of  25 January 
2013. It also had a large group from Mansoura (Daqahliya governorate 
in the Delta), numbering 40 members.10 The faction of  April 6 that has 
resorted to violence is centred in Cairo, Alexandria and Mansoura. 
Urbanisation and Cairo’s centrality have played a fundamental role 
in the tendency of  educated, frustrated youth to use political violence. 
Large cities are one determinant of  violence in Egypt, which contradicts 
Urdal’s thesis that cities play a secondary role in the eruption of  political 
violence, whereas the countryside retains the great repertoire of  youth 
violence (Urdal 2006: 624). 
1.4 Organisation, ideology, and past experience
Past experience, organisational structure, and ideology are determinants 
of  any group’s propensity for violence and its capacity to adopt violent 
tactics. Among Egyptian youth groups, the Ultras are the only ones with 
the expertise and organisational form that make violent tactics a viable 
option. The experience of  other youth groups is limited to the violent 
clashes with security forces during the January 25 revolution, especially 
on 27–28 January. 
Organisationally, most youth movements are fluid and have no clear 
central leadership. This has given rise to overlapping memberships 
whereby a great many young people who participated in the revolution 
were simultaneously involved in multiple organisations rather than 
holding exclusive commitments to one particular group. This, in turn, 
has promoted incoherent action by youth movements. A member of  
April 6, for example, may also belong to the Ultras and the Black Bloc 
or a radical political organisation such as the Revolutionary Socialists. 
The political action of  these young people was influenced by their 
multiple affiliations with various organisations and movements. At the 
same time, the individual experiences of  these young people became the 
basis for youth movements’ collective experience as opposed to building 
a collective around common ideology. 
The Ultras are central to understanding youth mobilisation in Egypt on 
account of  having the largest youth constituency in the country, with the 
exception of  the Islamist movements. The Ultras are the most organised 
of  all non-Islamist movements in Egypt. Any study of  youth and 
violence necessitates a focus on the Ultras since they deployed violence 
prior to the January 25 revolution, and also in its aftermath. They were 
also key actors in the violent struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood 
and non-Islamist forces in the lead up to the 30 June revolution. The 
Ultras fan clubs appeared in 2007. The first was the White Knights, 
the first fan club in Egypt, followed by the Ahli Ultras, who first made 
their presence known in the stands on 13 April 2007, during a match 
between Ahli and Enbi.11 
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The international origin and development of  the Ultras is uncertain, 
although some reports suggest that the first fan clubs arose in China 
and South America. Their appearance in Europe is associated with 
fans of  the Croatian club Hajduk Split, who first exhibited extreme 
fan behaviour during a match on 29 November 1950 against the club’s 
traditional rival, Red Star Belgrade, when, after the final whistle, Hajduk 
fans collectively and methodically stormed the pitch. Ultras groups then 
emerged in Italy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Fossa Dei Leoni, a fan 
club of  Milan, arrived on the scene in 1968, while other reports indicate 
that the first Italian Ultras group appeared in Torino in 1951 under 
the name Fedelissimi Granata. The first to call themselves Ultras were 
supporters of  Sampdoria in 1969, which is the same year that the Inter 
Boys appeared, an Ultras group supporting Inter Milan.12
Ultras in Egypt have adopted a cluster-like organisational form with a 
number of  overlapping circles in contact with a central decision-making 
core.13 This organisational structure works to manage Ultras activities, 
which involve massive numbers of  young men, while also maintaining 
coordinated, consistent action. The main leadership and individual 
Ultras are linked by the capo, the leader of  an individual section. The 
capo administers the affairs of  a cluster group containing hundreds 
of  fans in a particular area, while also coordinating with the leaders 
of  other clusters. The capo’s role is clear in cheering activities during 
football matches, when individual sections each assume a specific role, 
and the capo is responsible for making sure his section does its part 
of  the exercise in synchrony with the other groups. During matches, 
the capo leads the cheering and chants, and one can observe clear 
coordination between capos and between the capo and his section. 
According to Mahmoud Abduh Ali, 
The Ultras have no president, but rather a group of  founders who 
quickly recede into the background when the group is able to stand 
on its own feet. Action within the Ultras is directed by small working 
groups (top boys), each of  which is responsible for organizing group 
activities such as the design and execution of  murals and placards, 
leading chants in the bleachers, arranging trips, and overseeing the 
group’s financial resources.14
This organisational structure and its capacity to support synchronised, 
coordinated activity is reflected in the Ultras’ ability to stage acts of  
coordinated, sudden violence, as was seen in January 2013, when the 
fans paralysed the metro system in the capital on the eve of  the sentences 
handed down to defendants in the trial for the Port Said stadium massacre.
The Ultras’ adoption of  violent tactics has been further fostered by their 
experience in engaging with security forces since 2007. Elgohary says, 
Since the establishment of  the groups in Egypt, the police have 
tried by all means to contain Ultras’ activities in and outside of  the 
stadium. Before the revolution, Ultras members would be subjected 
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to demeaning searches when entering the stands and the confiscation 
of  items used during the cheering such as flags, banners, and 
placards for the synchronized entrances. They were even prohibited 
from bringing in bottles of  water to the bleachers.15 
The Ultras had a generally hostile relationship with the police due 
to the latter’s apprehensiveness, with security fearing potentially 
uncontrollable violence on the pitch and the fans’ capacity to mobilise. 
Security thus used violence to counter the Ultras. In turn, the Ultras 
groups adopted a single anti-police slogan that appeared frequently in 
their graffiti and their synchronised entrances to the bleachers: All Cops 
Are Bastards, or ACAB.
This provides a window into the ideas underpinning the Ultras. The 
fan clubs have no coherent ideology, but, in Egypt, are based on two 
principal ideas: loyalty to a particular football club and rebellion. 
According to Elgohary, 
The Ultras’ strong sense of  belonging can be explained by the state 
of  alienation rampant not only in Egypt, but in many other Arab 
countries – a sense of  alienation from the state. These young people 
thus inevitably created an entity or idea to belong to.16 
The second pillar of  the Ultras’ identity is rebellion, which entails both 
a rejection of  authority and a hostility toward security forces. 
In this context, many note that Egyptian Ultras groups have been 
penetrated by various ideological organisations, most prominently the 
Ahli Ultras by the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis loyal to Hazem 
Salah Abu Ismail.17 Although this seems incompatible with the main 
purpose of  the Ultras groups – namely, supporting football clubs – 
young people’s multiple organisational affiliations, discussed above, 
mean that many Ultras capos also belong to political groups, a fact 
that led the media to make these allegations of  penetration. Overall, 
however, Ultras groups in Egypt are not associated organisationally 
or ideologically with any political factions, governed only by the all-
important ideas of  club loyalty and rebellion. 
The Black Bloc was established formally in 2012, specifically after 
Mohamed Morsi won the presidency. Its raison d’être was to bring down 
the rule of  the Muslim Brotherhood, and one of  its key tactics was to 
attack the Brotherhood’s economic base. The founders of  Black Bloc 
groups have also adopted a cluster-like organisation, with a separate 
leadership for each cluster that is careful not to reveal the identity of  
members to any other group. The founding principles of  the Black Bloc 
are rebellion and a rejection of  Muslim Brotherhood authority. Indeed, 
the one thing members share is their hostility to the Brotherhood. The 
group’s founders chose not to adopt a specific ideology to better allow 
the recruitment of  young people from various political movements 
and factions, motivated and united by the goal of  bringing down 
Brotherhood rule.
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Young people in the Black Bloc borrowed the group’s name, slogan, and 
dress code from European and American anarchist groups that emerged 
in the 1980s, but did not adopt the ideological framework of  the latter, 
largely because they sought to create propagandistic hype through 
the internationally-known name, slogan and garb. Perhaps the main 
shared feature of  the Egyptian group and the Western movements is 
the use of  violent tactics. The activists were initially involved in peaceful 
movements and sit-ins, but found that peaceful protest was unable 
to bring the change they desired; they thus turned to violence. The 
notoriety that accrued to Black Bloc groups due to their use of  violence 
in the Seattle demonstrations of  1999 and the G8 conference of  2007 
was replicated in Egypt, as the Black Bloc became a constant media 
presence soon after its establishment and following its use of  violence 
against the Muslim Brotherhood in the first half  of  2013. 
The Black Bloc in Egypt was short-lived, lasting no more than six 
months. It grew out of  Facebook pages for the so-called ‘Black 
Revolutionary Bloc’ after groups of  Muslim Brotherhood members 
attacked protestors from secular parties and movements at the Ittihadiya 
presidential palace in December 2012; and in tandem with the 
emergence of  Hazimun militias (followers of  Hazem Salah Abu Ismail), 
who surrounded Media Production City, the home of  satellite channels’ 
studios in Cairo. Discussions on the Black Bloc’s Facebook pages 
revolved around the importance of  standing up to Islamist militias, and 
its first statement stressed that its goal was to ‘bring down the Muslim 
Brotherhood regime and its military arms’. Notably, the group said that 
it would not accost police and army personnel, but it warned that the 
Black Bloc would not hesitate to respond to the Ministry of  Interior 
if  the latter confronted it. The first street appearance of  Black Bloc 
youth came on 25 January 2013, during celebrations of  the second 
anniversary of  the revolution, when dozens of  them assembled in 
downtown Talaat Harb Square wearing the group’s signature black 
clothing and masks. 
Organisationally speaking, the Black Bloc adopted a cluster-like 
structure, forming 14 separate groups of  20–30 individuals, with 
members of  each group unknown to the others. This structure gave the 
group freedom of  movement and made it more difficult to identify its 
leadership. The previous violent experiences of  Black Bloc members 
were limited to clashes with police in January 2011 and, later, clashes on 
Mohammed Mahmoud Street in November 2011.
The April 6 movement was established by a group of  young people 
belonging to different ideological and political schools of  thought, 
most of  them without any previous background in politics or political 
action, following the labour strike in Mahalla al-Kubra on 6 April 2008. 
The April 6 movement had made a call on Facebook for a nationwide 
strike to express opposition to the ‘inheritance of  the presidency’ from 
Mubarak to his son, Gamal, and to protest the capitalist policies of  the 
Egyptian government. The group gained renown in the 2011 revolution 
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when many of  its young people led demonstrations and it became an 
icon of  the Egyptian revolution. 
The organisational form of  April 6 is similar to that of  European social 
movements, with a central leadership and individual groups in each 
area led by local leaders with decision-making authority. April 6 is an 
open organisation and sets no conditions for membership, making it 
more of  an umbrella youth organisation. This relatively loose structure 
and the absence of  a specific ideology makes it more of  a social 
movement than a narrow party formation. Its structure also enabled the 
movement to avoid explicitly defending violence although several of  its 
members were involved in violent clashes with security forces during 
demonstrations. In principle, the movement is committed to non-
violence, as the adoption of  tactical violence would diminish its broad 
membership and undermine its flexible organisational structure.
As is clear from this analysis, Egyptian youth movements involved 
in either offensive or defensive violence had no specific ideological 
framework other than an amorphous notion of  rebellion. This contradicts 
Della Porta’s thesis that violence requires a rejectionist ideology (Della 
Porta 2009). Rather, for these movements, the main factor for the use of  
violence was a confrontation with a specific opponent – for Ultras, the 
police and for the Black Bloc, the Muslim Brotherhood. In contrast, the 
broad umbrella-like nature of  April 6 acted as a curb on violent tactics, 
although a great many of  its members were involved in fierce clashes with 
security forces or the Muslim Brotherhood. 
2 Self-described view of violence
This study has looked at several factors for the increasing turn to violence 
by youth protest movements in Egypt following the January 25 revolution, 
including the population age structure, higher levels of  education 
combined with the inability of  the market to absorb millions of  new 
graduates, the failure of  cities to absorb contradictions, the transitional 
period as a critical phase that permits the emergence of  violence as an 
option to resolve pressing political and social issues, shared experience, 
and the adoption of  a strategy of  rebellion. But understanding the 
violence of  youth movements in Egypt also requires understanding 
how young people involved in these movements see violence and 
examining the stance of  various movements on violence. Sole reliance 
on an objective analytical framework that ignores the subjective risks 
drawing mistaken conclusions about Egyptian youth movements’ general 
predilection for violence. 
An analysis of  field interviews and data about youth movements reveals 
that there is a clear tendency to reject violence in political action and, 
indeed, a recognition that the success of  the Egyptian revolution in 
removing Mubarak was due to its peaceful nature. Even members of  
the Black Bloc boast that they are ‘the kings of  non-violence’,18 noting 
that no person was killed in their attacks on Muslim Brotherhood 
property and offices between January and June 2013. In addition, all of  
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those involved in protest movements stress that it is security forces that 
typically start the violence and that their violence is purely defensive.
In this context, justifications for violence are limited to self-defence. 
Hisham, a 27-year-old photojournalist and former Revolutionary 
Socialist, who was wounded more than once in violent clashes, says, 
Our violence was a response to the violence of  the other side, whether security, 
paid thugs, the Brotherhood, or regime loyalists. The other side was always 
the one to start the violence so we defended ourselves and protected the other 
participants in the march.19
Hisham justifies his involvement in violence, saying, 
I’m against violence. I would leave home to take part in a peaceful march, but 
I’d be angered by the actions of  the police or the other side and see people in our 
march killed and injured. Then I’d decide to join the fray and counter the attack 
and even try to get even and avenge those who were killed or injured. 
This highlights another motive for violence – revenge – in addition to 
the defence of  protests and demonstrations. 
The picture is not complete, however, without a discussion of  
intractable elements within marches or demonstrations organised by 
youth movements. Hisham states, 
There were in fact thugs and [homeless] street children in the marches who would 
sometimes start the violence. But we can’t stop anyone from taking part in the 
march. Anyway, the police and the Brotherhood also used thugs and street children. 
Hisham reached a clear conclusion based on his experience with 
violence during demonstrations: 
The violence did not help us realise our goals. In fact, it ended with more dead 
and wounded, criticism of  young people, and allegations of  thuggery and 
vandalism. The ideal solution is peaceful action and escalation through strikes 
or civil disobedience to achieve goals.
Hisham’s words distil the trajectory of  an ongoing debate among 
youth groups in Egypt. It starts with the assertion that violence is 
purely defensive, but then goes on to affirm the use of  violence for 
revenge, followed by the admissions that thugs and homeless children 
in their own protests helped to inflame the violence. It concludes 
with a recognition that violence had negative consequences for the 
achievement of  youth movements’ ultimate goals. This ongoing 
dialogue, heard among young people in Egypt, has led to a critique of  
the use of  violence. According to Della Porta, the strategy of  violence 
arises from a collective debate, the result of  a dynamic process of  
engagement between social or political groups. In our case, however, 
the social debate and engagement between youth groups has ended in a 
rejection rather than an adoption of  violence by the majority. 
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This does not mean that more radical voices do not exist that hold to the 
necessity of  violence in the face of  the police and political opponents, the 
focus of  this study. Islam, a 22-year-old humanities graduate and a fixture 
of  political demonstrations since January 25, is a member of  this minority: 
The Interior Ministry was and remains criminals and killers, and until it is 
restructured and reformed, fighting and resisting it is a revolutionary duty. Blood 
is the fuel of  revolutions and the blood of  the dead is an incentive to stand firm in 
the face of  the authority. It’s a gain.20 
Islam defends the use of  violence as the sole means of  changing the 
regime and countering the security apparatus in the country. He 
supports the idea of  vengeance from a somewhat different perspective:
People from popular areas get involved in violence because they’ve been oppressed, 
marginalised, and tortured in police stations, so they have a longstanding grudge 
against the police.
Vengeance as a motivator is particularly striking among young people 
who are involved in violence in protests and demonstrations. Motazz, a 
21-year-old graduate of  a social service institute, emphasises the death 
of  his friend during a post-revolution demonstration as a reason for his 
use of  violence: 
I saw my best friend die in front of  me and I decided to take part in all the violent 
demonstrations. Even though I recognise that violence only leads to more bloodshed, 
I’m venting the grief  within me.21 
Shadi, a 22-year-old Coptic university graduate who belongs to a liberal 
party, speaks with the same logic: 
I’ve seen friends killed during the events of  Mohammed Mahmoud, the Cabinet 
building, and Maspero, and I’ve seen people who’ve been blinded by the police, so 
I was forced to turn to violence because of  these bloody scenes.22 
In contrast, 29-year-old Sherif  Abd al-Younis speaks of  violence more 
as a defensive act: 
We aren’t thugs. We’re defending our right to life against those who 
want to ground us down yet again [the Muslim Brotherhood].23
These young people speak largely for a small segment of  radical groups 
within April 6 or left-wing formations, and they have largely been 
involved in demonstrations only since the January revolution. Their use 
of  violence is predicated on the logic of  self-defence and taking revenge 
on the security apparatus. This language differs from that used by young 
Ultras who employ violence. A.A., a 20-something-year-old member of  
the Ahli Ultras who asked to remain anonymous, says, 
Fighting with the Interior Ministry is just something I like to do, even if  they 
haven’t done anything. The violence always used to start with the police, but later 
we started it because we knew in advance that security would attack us.24
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This view is consistent with the Ultras’ perception of  themselves as a 
vital part of  the Egyptian revolution that is always willing to engage 
in violent confrontations. The clashes that took place on Mohammed 
Mahmoud Street, near to Tahrir Square, involved violent confrontations 
between youth protestors and the security forces of  the Ministry of  
Interior. The Al Masry Al Youm quoted one Ultras member as saying, 
We’re not afraid of  clashes. The true Ultras member is not afraid. 
In fact, some of  us are happy to be injured because that becomes a 
memento for him and his [Ultras] brothers.25 
These, then, are young people who consider the organisation they 
belong to as more of  a brotherhood and see clashes and conflict as part 
of  its doctrine of  protest. 
Ironically, the Black Bloc, according to one member, see themselves as 
‘masters of  non-violence’, saying, 
The movement did not kill or injure any person and attacked no government 
institution or building. It was always careful to avoid state property. We largely 
use Molotovs and birdshot, while the use of  firearms is limited to solely threat 
and protection.26 
According to another Black Bloc member, in a testimony given to 
researcher Hani al-Aasar, 
Violence against the regime [the Brotherhood regime] is legitimate 
because it is violence directed at an illegitimate regime. Violence has 
become the only way to express one’s opinion and resist the special 
organization [i.e. the Brotherhood military wing].27
The views of  several young men involved in clashes and acts of  violence 
clearly indicate that the major justification for violence is revenge, 
followed by self-defence. It is also clear that there is no coherent 
ideology or ultimate goal for the use of  violence outside of  an attempt 
to punish police. The punitive aspect is how young people justify the 
violence to themselves, without the need to adopt a clear political 
objective. Some interviewees did discuss the need for violence to create 
‘chaos’ which might be necessary to curb attempts by the regime to 
control and suppress liberties, but even this supposition is not based 
on an integrated political project that employs political violence as a 
tool. This limited view of  violence among the participants themselves 
makes it impossible for them to maintain the conflict for a period of  
years. Ultimately, the absence of  a youth organisation that explicitly 
adopts violence as a tactic to realise its political project reduces the risk 
of  continued violence or the emergence of  new forms of  violence. On 
the contrary, it indicates that the main arena for violence will remain 
random violence motivated by a desire for revenge or self-defence. 
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3 Conclusion
There is no positive correlation between youth movements and violence 
in Egypt. Youth movements that emerged outside the political Islamist 
groups resorted to violence occasionally, such as the Ultras and the 
April 6 movement, while movements that exclusively deployed violence 
as the only strategy of  engagement were more likely to form and then 
disappear again, such as the Black Bloc. It is a constellation of  factors 
that made the youth bulge predisposed to resorting to violence in the 
post-2011 transitional period, most notably the high percentage of  
education among young people, and the sizeable proportion of  youth 
who migrate to the city in search of  employment. Against the backdrop 
of  the military assumption of  power in the aftermath of  the 30 June 
2013 ousting of  President Morsi, and the confrontation between 
political Islam and the state, the author believes that youth movements’ 
resorting to violence will significantly decrease. 
Notes
* Researchers Ishaq Essa and Hind Magdi helped gather data for this 
study; Hind Magdi conducted the field interviews with members of  
youth movements used in this article. 
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